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Non-Decision-Making Supervisor’s Animus Sufficient to Prove Employer’s Discharge Decision is Discriminatory

October 13, 2011 by

The U.S. Supreme Court, in a decision issued last March, has confirmed that employees may bring successful discrimination claims in federal court based on a “cat’s paw” theory—that is, based on the discriminatory animus of the employee’s supervisor, even if that supervisor did not make the ultimate adverse employment decision—so long as the employee can show the supervisor influenced the ultimate decision. Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 131 S.Ct. 1186.

Vincent Staub also served in the Army Reserve. His supervisor was hostile to Staub’s military service, and made comments indicating his desire to get rid of him.

The supervisor issued Staub a warning, motivated by antagonism towards Staub’s Reserve service, and later notified the vice president of Human Resources that Staub again violated the company policy referenced in the disciplinary warning. After speaking with one of Staub’s coworkers, and reviewing Staub’s personnel file, the VP terminated Staub. Staub grieved through the company’s grievance procedure, and alleged his supervisor falsified the allegations because of antagonism towards his military service. The VP, who heard Staub’s challenge, denied the appeal.

Staub sued Proctor under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), asserting his discharge was motivated by hostility to his service in the Army Reserve. An appellate court reversed a jury verdict in favor of Staub, concluding Staub could only prove his discharge was illegal if the ultimate decisionmaker blindly relied on the advice of the individual with the discriminatory animus.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held, “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by antimilitary animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.” The Court concluded the supervisor’s warning, issued because of discriminatory animus, was a proximate cause of Staub’s discharge, since Staub’s supervisor intended the warning to cause an adverse employment action and the VP in fact relied on the warning to terminate Staub. The Court also noted that the VP failed to perform an adequate investigation into Staub’s assertions his supervisor harbored ill will towards him because of his military service.

The Court did not discuss whether its holding would extend “cat’s paw” liability to an employer when it was a nonsupervisory co-worker— rather than a supervisor— who harbors discriminatory animus, if the co-worker influences the ultimate decision -maker. California courts have recognized the “cat’s paw” theory of liability since at least 2000, and have applied it to cases alleging employment discrimination under the Fair Employment and Housing Act.

The material on this website is provided by Beeson, Tayer & Bodine for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with their own legal counsel before acting on any of the information presented. Some of the articles are updated periodically, and are marked with the date of the last update. Again, readers should consult with their own legal counsel for the most current information and to obtain professional advice before acting on any of the information presented.